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laws. It also highlights certain enactments by the Georgia General
Assembly revising the Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.").
I.
A.

CORPORATIONS

Piercing the Corporate Veil

The concept of "piercing the corporate veil," to hold shareholders
personally liable for the debts of the corporation, has been used by the
Georgia courts in an attempt to remedy fraud or injustice. The courts,

however, have failed to define precise standards to apply to rather
predictable factual scenarios.

Consequently, the results often seem

contradictory and confused. 2
Georgia courts generally frame the issue as whether the corporation
is the alter ego or business conduit of its owner.3 The principal inquiry
is not the composition of corporate ownership or control because, under
Georgia law, a corporation and its shareholders or officers are distinct
entities even if wholly-owned and controlled by an individual.4
To establish a claim to pierce the corporate veil, the plaintiff must
show: (1) that the shareholder's disregard of the corporate entity made
it a mere instrumentality for the transaction of the shareholder's own
affairs; (2) that there is such unity of interest and ownership that the
separate personality of the corporation and the shareholder or officer no
longer exist; and (3) that to adhere to the doctrine of a separate
corporate entity would promote injustice or protect fraud.'
For the issue to be submitted to a jury, Georgia courts require
evidence that the corporate arrangement is a sham used "to defeat
justice, to perpetuate fraud, or to evade statutory, contractual or tort
responsibility."6

2. See Paul A. Quir6s & Donna Ruth Jones, Business Associations, 40 MERCER L. REV.
61, 68 (1988).
3. J & J Materials, Inc. v. Conyers Seafood Co., 214 Ga. App. 63, 64, 446 S.E.2d 781,
782 (1994). See also Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 39, 401 S.E.2d 738, 739 (1991);
Derbyshire v. United Builders Supplies, 194 Ga. App. 840, 844, 392 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1990);
Amason v. Whitehead, 186 Ga. App. 320, 321, 367 S.E.2d 107, 108 (1988).
4. International Telecomm. Exch. Corp. v. MCI Telecomm. Corp., 892 F. Supp. 1520,
1551-52 (N.D. Ga. 1995) (citing United States v. Fidelity Capital Corp., 920 F.2d 827, 837
(11th Cir. 1991); Byrd v. Brand, 140 Ga. App. 135, 136, 230 S.E.2d 113, 114 (1976)).
5. J & J Materials, 214 Ga. App. at 64-65, 446 S.E.2d at 782-83. See also Derbyshire,
194 Ga. App. at 844, 392 S.E.2d at 40; Amason, 186 Ga. App. at 321, 367 S.E.2d at 108.
6. Hickman, 261 Ga. at 39, 401 S.E.2d at 740. See also J & JMaterials,214 Ga. App.
at 65, 446 S.E.2d at 783; Derbyshire, 194 Ga. App. at 844, 392 S.E.2d at 40; Amason, 186
Ga. App. at 321, 367 S.E.2d at 108.
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Every year there are a number of reported cases in which a claimant
seeks to pierce the corporate veil to reach the assets of a corporation's
shareholders. The inquiry is a jury question, and often these claims are
tried in the course of litigation, although they may not be the main claim
in a case. This activity will continue and be encouraged so long as the
legislature and the courts do not develop a more workable set of legal
standards to apply to veil-piercing claims.
1. The United States District Court for the Southern District
of Georgia Invokes the Veil-Piercing Theory to Hold a Principal
Liable for Acts of a Corporation. In Chemtall, Inc. v. Citi-Chem,
Inc.,' the United States district court refused to allow a New Jersey
corporation's sole shareholder and chief executive officer to hide behind
the corporate veil and avoid liability for his fraudulent acts.8 Plaintiffs,
Chemtall, Inc. and Pearl River Polymers, Inc., sued Citi-Chem and
Calvin M. King (individually as chief executive officer of Citi-Chem) for
failing to abide by a lockbox payment agreement entered into by the
parties.9
Chemtall, a Riceboro, Georgia company, and Pearl River Polymers, a
corporation owned by Chemtall, manufactured water-treatment polymer
products. Citi-Chem had an agreement with both companies to buy their
products and distribute the products under the "Citi-Chem" trade name.
Under a lockbox payment agreement, Citi-Chem would invoice its
customers with instructions to remit their payments to a Georgia bank
lockbox. From there the money would be divided pursuant to the
parties' agreement. ° The arrangement provided that a "managing
agent" would remove the funds from the lockbox and send each of the
parties their appropriate share.1 Although King originally acted as
the lockbox's managing agent, Chemtall and Pearl River soon realized
that King was slow in forwarding their share, and they replaced him as
managing agent with Chemtall. 2 After the change, Chemtall and
Pearl River "performed all lockbox accounting activity in Georgia, and
from there sent checks to Citi-Chem in New Jersey." 3
A few years after Chemtall took over as managing agent of the
lockbox, King began violating the original payment agreement. 4 King,

7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.

992 F. Supp. 1390 (S.D. Ga. 1998).
Id. at 1413.
Id. at 1397.
Id. at 1392.
Id. at 1393.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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without the knowledge of Chemtall, directed its customers to send their
payments to a New Jersey address.15 According to testimony from
former Citi-Chem employees, Citi-Chem would send an invoice to its
customers directing them to send all payments directly to a bank
account set up by Citi-Chem in New Jersey. s A copy of the invoice
showing the correct lockbox address would be sent to Chemtall and Pearl
River to cover up the scheme. 7
During the same period that King was diverting the customer
payments to Citi-Chem, he was also diverting corporate resources to
himself. King directed his employees to set up a bank account in the
name of Citi-Chem, Inc., D.C. ("CCI-DC") to receive the diverted
customer payments. From this account King transferred to himself a
"consulting fee" of $45,000, which he used to fund a separate business,
King's Liquors. 8 He also used $6,000 of the funds in the CCI-DC
account to purchase a BMW and "transferred two [new] automobiles out
of Citi-Chem and into his own name." 9
Claiming a $152,082.80 arrearage and breach of contract, Chemtall
and Pearl River sued Citi-Chem and King in a Georgia state court and
obtained several Temporary Restraining Orders ("TROs"). ° Citi-Chem
notified its customers to disregard the TROs and to continue sending
payments to the CCI-DC account. 2' Shortly thereafter, Citi-Chem filed
for bankruptcy protection in New Jersey.22 King invoked the corporate
veil defense claiming that he signed the lockbox agreement in his
capacity as Citi-Chem's president
and that only the bankrupt corpora2
tion was subject to liability.

1

In order for a plaintiff to be successful in a veil-piercing claim, the
plaintiff must show that the defendant disregarded the corporate
form.24 In the past, Georgia courts have held that the corporate veil is
sufficiently pierced when "a corporate officer participates with his

15. Id.
16. Id. at 1396.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 1397.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 1400.
24. Id. at 1402 (citing Heyde v. Xtraman, Inc., 199 Ga. App. 303, 306, 404 S.E.2d 607,
610 (1991)). "There must be some evidence of abuse of the corporate form. [In other
words,] [p]laintiflls] must show that the defendant disregarded the separateness of legal
entities by commingling on an interchangeable or joint basis or confusing the otherwise
separate properties, records or control." Id.
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corporation in wrongfully converting another's property."2 5 Under this
analogy, the district court refused to allow King the protection of the
corporate veil. 26
The court held that Chemtall and Pearl River
produced sufficient evidence to prove that King abused the corporate veil
and subjected himself to personal liability by commingling the corporation's funds with his own and directing the corporation to perpetrate
fraud upon its creditors and to evade contractual responsibility.27
2. Court Finds Sole Shareholder Individually Liable for
Executing Bad Check. In Kolodkin v. Cohen,28 the Georgia Court
of Appeals held that the president of a corporation can be held personally liable under O.C.G.A. section 13-6-1529 for drafting a corporate check
when the account contains insufficient funds to cover the check. 0
Cohen was the president, sole shareholder, and director of Amalgamated
T-Shirts, Inc.31
Kolodkin and Amalgamated entered into a real
property lease agreement. Amalgamated stopped doing business in
October of 1995, when the corporate account did not have sufficient
funds to cover the lease payment. As expected, the November payment
was returned for insufficient funds. Kolodkin sued Cohen in his
individual capacity under O.C.G.A. section 13-6-15 for drafting the
check.3 2 O.C.G.A. section 13-6-15 provides as follows:
Notwithstanding any criminal sanctions which may apply, any person
who makes, utters, draws, or delivers any check, draft, or order upon
any bank, depository, person, firm, or corporation for the payment of
money, which drawee refuses to honor the instrument for lack of funds
or credit in the account from which to pay the instrument or because
the maker has no account with the drawee, and who fails to pay the
same amount in cash to the payee named in the instrument within ten
days after a written demand therefor, as provided in subsection (c) of
this Code section, has been delivered to the maker by certified mail
shall be liable to the payee, in addition to the amount owing upon such
check, draft, or order, for damages of double the amount so owing, but

25. Id. (citing DCA Architects, Inc. v. American Bldg. Consultants, 203 Ga. App. 598,
600, 417 S.E.2d 386, 388-89 (1992)).
26. Id. at 1413.
27. Id. at 1403-04.
28. 230 Ga. App. 384, 496 S.E.2d 515 (1998).

29.
30.
31.
32.

O.C.G.A. § 13-6-15 (Supp. 1998).
230 Ga. App. at 387, 496 S.E.2d at 518.
Id. at 385, 496 S.E.2d at 517.
Id., 496 S.E.2d at 516-17.
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in no case more than $500.00, and any court costs incurred by the
payee in taking the action."

Although this Code section had not been interpreted in Georgia, the
court found that the statute appeared to create a limited exception to the
general corporate principle that an individual who signs in a representative capacity is not personally liable.34 The court reasoned that
nowhere in the Code was there any "language limiting liability for a
maker acting in a representative capacity." 5 The court felt that had
the Georgia General Assembly intended to limit liability of persons
signing in a representative capacity, it would have done so in the

Code.3
3. Court Refuses to Pierce the Corporate Veil Without
Evidence of Fraud. In General InsuranceServices, Inc. v. Marcola,37
the Georgia Court of Appeals was asked to reverse a grant of judgment

notwithstanding the verdict for defendant, Karl Byers." Plaintiff sued
Karl Byers individually as president of a corporation that had breached
a contract to purchase plaintiff's corporation.39 Plaintiff claimed that
"Karl Byers agreed to purchase plaintiff's [corporation] while concealing
from her his intent to transfer his interest immediately to the third
parties, ... to whom [she] had previously refused to sell her [business]."4 °
The court refused to pierce the corporate veil and impose liability upon
the buyer of a business.4 In its explanation the court argued that
"[lthe corporation is prima facie a distinct legal entity with rights and
liabilities which are separate from those of [its shareholders]."4 2 "One
who deals with a corporation as such an entity cannot, in the absence of

33. O.C.G.A. § 13-6-15(a).
34. 230 Ga. App. at 386, 496 S.E.2d at 517.
35. Id. (citing O.C.G.A. § 11-3-404 (1994 & Supp. 1998) (pertaining "to all persons
purporting to act as or on behalf of a corporation without authority to do so"); O.C.G.A.
§ 11-3-403 (1994 & Supp. 1998) ("limiting liability of an authorized representative who
signs his or her own name to an instrument")).
36. Id.
37. 231 Ga. App. 144, 497 S.E.2d 679 (1998).
38. Id. at 145, 497 S.E.2d at 680.
39. Id. at 144, 497 S.E.2d at 680.
40. Id. at 149, 497 S.E.2d at 683.
41. Id., 497 S.E.2d at 684.
42. Id., 497 S.E.2d at 683 (citing Midtown Properties, Inc. v. George F. Richardson, 139
Ga. App. 182, 185, 228 S.E.2d 303, 308 (1976); Jones v. Adamson's, Inc., 147 Ga. App. 282,
283, 248 S.E.2d 514, 516 (1978)).
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fraud, deny the legality of the corporate existence for the purpose of
holding the owner liable."43
According to the court, the circumstances did not lend themselves to
a conclusion that the defendant corporation (GIS) was a sham or that
defendant Karl Byers made false or misleading representations to
plaintiff that would amount to fraud." Thus, the court concluded that
the trial court correctly granted a judgment notwithstanding the verdict
in favor of Karl Byers.45
B.

PersonalLiability for PreincorporationTransactions
In Zuberi v. Gimbert,"' the Georgia Court of Appeals held that an
individual who signed a commerical lease on behalf of a nonexistent
corporation was personally liable for damages to the warehouse.4 7
Under O.C.G.A. section 14-2-204, all persons purporting to act as or on
behalf of a corporation, with actual knowledge there was no incorporation, are jointly and severally liable for all liabilities created while so
acting.48
In Zuberi, defendant signed a commercial lease for the use of a
warehouse "as the purported representative of a non-existent corporation, 'ATM Manufacturing, Inc."'49 Although Zuberi testified that he
was acting on behalf of ATM America, no evidence indicated that ATM
America existed as a corporation, and regardless, the name on the lease
was ATM Manufacturing, Inc., not ATM America Corp.5" The attorneys
for Zuberi argued that he acted on behalf of ATM Enterprises, Inc. and
"meant to sign on behalf of this existing corporation."51
Whether Zuberi made a simple mistake in his signature was not
relevant to the issue of liability.5 2 The court of appeals found the
difference in names substantial and did not involve the mere abbreviation of a longer official corporate name."53 Zuberi tried to apply a

43. Id., 497 S.E.2d at 684 (citing Lamas v. Baldwin, 140 Ga. App. 37, 40, 230 S.E.2d
13, 15-16 (1976); Williams Plaza" Inc. v. Sedgefield Sportsware, Inc., 164 Ga. App. 720, 723,
297 S.E.2d 342, 345 (1982)).
44. Id. (quoting Hickman v. Hyzer, 261 Ga. 38, 41, 401 S.E.2d 738, 740 (1991)).
45. Id.
46. 230 Ga. App. 471, 496 S.E.2d 741 (1998).
47. Id. at 473, 496 S.E.2d at 742.
48. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-204 (1994).
49. 230 Ga. App. at 472, 496 S.E.2d at 741.
50. Id. at 472-73, 496 S.E.2d at 742.
51. Id. at 473, 496 S.E.2d at 742.
52. Id.
53. Id. (distinguishing Pinson v. Hartsfield Ctr., 191 Ga. App. 459,461,382 S.E.2d 136,
138 (1989), which held that a mere "misnomer" is not enough to impose personal liability
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corporation by estoppel argument, suggesting that plaintiffs believed
they were dealing with a corporation.54 The court found that Zuberi
signed on behalf of a nonexistent corporation and, regardless of
plaintiffs' belief, he was precluded from asserting the defense of
corporation by estoppel."g
C. Successor Liability: Product Liability for Products Manufactured
by PredecessorCorporation
In Farmex, Inc. v. Wainwright,5 6 the Georgia Supreme Court faced
the issue of imposing liability on a corporation based upon the "continuation theory" of liability. Third-party plaintiffs were sued when their
trailer became unhitched and struck a vehicle. They alleged that a hitch
pin caused the accident and filed a third-party complaint against
Farmex, even though the hitch pin involved had been designed and
manufactured by JA-BIL, Inc. Farmex purchased JA-BIL, Inc. in an
asset purchase transaction 5and
continued selling the hitch pins
7
manufactured by JA-BIL, Inc.
The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Farmex,
concluding that, under the continuation theory, Farmex was not the
"manufacturer" of the hitch pin for purposes of strict liability.58 The
court of appeals reversed, imposing liability on Farmex, even though it
did not find present 59the elements of "the continuation theory, as
traditionally applied."
An asset sale generally will not produce liability upon the purchaser
for the acts of the seller unless one of four exceptions is present: "(1)
there is an agreement to assume liabilities; (2) the transaction is, in fact,
a merger; (3) the transaction is a fraudulent attempt to avoid liabilities;
or (4) the purchaser is a mere continuation of the predecessor corporation."6 ° Departing from any of the foregoing recognized exceptions, the
court of appeals reversed the trial court's grant of summary judgment
reasoning that (1) the manufacturer is better able to protect itself and
bear the cost while the consumer is helpless; and (2) the manufacturer

upon the representative signing on behalf of the corporation).
54. Id.

55. Id.
56. 269 Ga. 548, S.E.2d 802 (1998).
57. Id. at 548-49, 501 S.E.2d at 803-04.
58. Id. at 548, 501 S.E.2d at 803.
59. Id. (citing Corbin v. Farmex, 227 Ga. App. 620, 622, 490 S.E.2d 395, 399 (1997)).
60. 227 Ga. App. at 621, 490 S.E.2d at 397 (citing Bullington v. Union Tool Corp., 254
Ga. 283, 284, 328 S.E.2d 726, 727 (1985)).
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is the instrumentality to look to for improvement of the product's
quality.61
Judge Smith dissented from the court of appeals decision reversing the
trial court's grant of summary judgment. 2 Judge Smith argued that
the court was bound by the Georgia Supreme Court's decision in
Bullington v. Union Tool Corp. 3 and that the majority opinion here did
not apply because the new corporation never produced the product.6 4
The Georgia Supreme Court granted certiorari to review the opinion
of the court of appeals. 5 The court found that strict liability applies
only to the "manufacturer of any personal property sold as new property"
and not to a "product seller."6 The common law continuation theory
applies only when there is some identity of ownership.67 The supreme
court agreed with the court of appeals that there was no identity of
ownership with respect to the assets purchased from JA-BIL by Farmex
and, thus, the common law continuation theory did not apply.66
The supreme court found that although Farmex continued the general
business of manufacturing, warehousing, and selling hitch parts, it "did
not continue to design or manufacture hitch pins of the type that it
acquired from JA-BIL." 69 The court distinguished a "manufacturer"
from a "product seller," holding that the purpose behind strict liability,
to protect defenseless victims from manufacturing defects, could
not be
70
advanced by imposing strict liability upon a "product seller."
D. Dissenting Shareholder'sRights
In Croxton v. MSC Holding, Inc.,v" the Georgia Court of Appeals
faced the question of how the statutory appraisal remedy for valuation
of shares of dissenting shareholders applies when a dissenting shareholder has an independent contract requiring the corporation to buy his
shares. Plaintiff Croxton was an employee and a fifty percent shareholder of defendant corporation for a number of years. Croxton's employment agreement provided that, upon his termination without cause, the

61. Id. at 622, 490 S.E.2d at 398 (quoting Cyr v. B. Offen & Co., 501 F.2d 1145, 1154
(1st Cir. 1974)).
62. Id. at 624, 490 S.E.2d at 399 (Smith, J., dissenting).
63. 254 Ga. 283, 328 S.E.2d 726 (1985).
64. 227 Ga. App. at 624, 490 S.E.2d at 399.
65. Farmex, 269 Ga. at 549, 501 S.E.2d at 803.
66. Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. §§ 51-1-11, -11.1 (Supp. 1998)).
67. Id., 501 S.E.2d at 803-04.
68. Id., 501 S.E.2d at 804.

69. Id.
70. Id. at 550, 501 S.E.2d at 804.
71.

227 Ga. App. 179, 489 S.E.2d 77 (1997).
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company would purchase his shares. Under the contract the purchase
price for the shares was predetermined."
The corporation terminated Croxton without cause in August 1995."s
In September 1995, the company "announced its intent to sell certain
corporate assets."74 Soon thereafter, Croxton's attorney sent notice to
the corporation stating that, if the proposed sale took place, the
shareholder "intended to demand payment for his shares as provided in
Article 13 of the Georgia Business Corporation Code (the statutory
appraisal procedure)."" Croxton sent a "dissenting shareholder's form"
to the corporation in December, demanding the "fair value" of his stock
pursuant to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-1302.76
When the corporation determined that the value of Croxton's shares
77
was zero, defendant demanded his contractually-set price of $400,000.
In March 1996, the corporation filed a petition pursuant to O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-1330 which it denominated as a "nonjury equitable
valuation proceeding to determine the fair value of [plaintiff's]
shares."7 The corporation claimed that, under Grace Bros. v. Farley
Industry,v9 the statutory proceeding for a dissenting shareholder's
demand constituted Croxton's exclusive remedy.8 0 The trial court
agreed with the corporation, "finding that Croxton's election to pursue
dissenter's rights barred any claim he might have had under his
contract.""'
The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's understanding of
Grace Bros. 2 According to the court of appeals, Grace Bros. specifically
recognized that individual shareholders may have individual, independent claims and may have a status which differs from other shareholders. 3 For those who occupy the status of dissenting shareholders, the
only remedy is the statutory appraisal remedy if the shareholder's
objection is essentially a complaint regarding the price of his shares. 4
The court of appeals reversed the trial court's holding reasoning that
Croxton's claim constituted an independent contract claim, not merely
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Id. at 179, 489 S.E.2d at 77.
Id., 489 S.E.2d at 78.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 179-80, 489 S.E.2d at 78.
Id. at 180, 489 S.E.2d at 78.
264 Ga. 817, 450 S.E.2d 814 (1995).
227 Ga. App. at 180, 489 S.E.2d at 78.
Id.
Id. at 180-81, 489 S.E.2d at 78.
Id. at 181, 489 S.E.2d at 79.
Id.
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a derivative claim.8 5 Croxton did have standing as a dissenting
shareholder because he notified the corporation that, if they sold the
assets, he would demand payment under O.C.G.A. section 14-21320(b).88 However, this demand did not constitute an "exclusive"
election of remedies of a dissenting shareholder. 7 Further, the court
of appeals found that Title 13 contained no statutory provision that
could deprive Croxton of his contractual right to payment for his shares
as provided in his contract.88
E. ShareholdersRights Plan: Georgia Law Gives Board of Directors
Sole Discretion
The United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia
determined in Invacare Corp. v. Healthdyne Technologies, Inc. 9 that
adopting bylaws proposed by tender offeror, requiring removal of the
poison pill provision, would violate a Georgia statute vesting in the
board of directors discretion to determine terms and conditions of a
shareholders rights plan.9" In Invacare Healthdyne's Board of Directors implemented a shareholders rights plan ("poison pill") to help
protect against hostile takeovers.91 Under the plan, each shareholder,
with the exception of the hostile bidder, would have the right to
purchase additional shares of common stock at half-price in takeover
situations."9 2 Healthdyne's rights plan also had a "continuing director"
feature, which required that any redemption or amendment of the rights
plan be approved by one or more directors who were members of the
Board prior to the adoption of the rights plan, or who were subsequently
elected to the Board with the recommendation and approval of the other
continuing directors.93
Invacare sought a preliminary injunction to have the continuing
director provision declared invalid.94 In addition, Invacare proposed a
bylaw that would require the current Board of Directors of Healthdyne
to amend the rights plan to eliminate the continuing director feature.98
Invacare argued that the continuing director provision was illegal under

85. Id. at 181-82, 183, 489 S.E.2d at 79, 80.
86. Id. at 182, 489 S.E.2d at 79.

87. Id.
88. Id.
89.

90.
91.
.92.
93.

968 F. Supp. 1578 (N.D. Ga. 1997).

Id. at 1582.
Id. at 1579.
Id.
Id.

94. Id.

95. Id.
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section 801(b) of the Georgia Code because it was a significant limitation
on the Board of Directors' powers, not included in the articles of
incorporation or the bylaws."9 6 Additionally, Invacare argued that the
continuing director provision of the rights plan violated the directors'
fiduciary duties.9 7
The court, relying on the Georgia Business Corporation Code (the
"Business Code"),9" made a determination that the implementation of
the shareholders rights plan was within the authority of the Board of
Directors and not a violation of the directors' fiduciary duties.99 The
Business Code provides that:
A corporation may issue rights, options, or warrants with respect to the
shares of the corporation whether or not in connection with the
issuance and sale of any of its shares or other securities. The board of
directors shall determine the terms upon which the rights, options, or
warrants are issued, their form and content, the consideration for
which they are to be issued, and the terms and conditions relating to
their exercise, including the time or times, the conditions precedent,
and the prices at which and the holders by whom the rights, options,
or warrants may be exercised.' °
In addition, O.C.G.A. section 14-2-624(c) states that:
[n]othing contained in Code section 14-2-601 shall be deemed to limit
the board of directors' authority to determine, in its sole discretion, the
terms and conditions of the rights, options, or warrants issuable
pursuant to this Code section. Such terms and conditions need not be
set forth in the articles of incorporation.0 1
Invacare relied primarily on a decision handed down by the New York

Supreme Court.0 2 In Bank of New York v. Irving Bank Corp.'

the

court invalidated a continuing director provision because it restricted the
power of the board of directors to manage the corporation. 10 4 The New

96. Id. at 1580 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-801(b) (1994) which provides:
All corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of the corporation managed under the direction of, its board
of directors, subject to any limitation set forth in the articles of incorporation,
bylaws approved by the shareholders, or agreements among the shareholders
which are otherwise lawful.).
97. Id. at 1581.
98. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
99. 968 F. Supp. at 1580, 1582.
100. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-624(a) (1994).
101. Id. § 14-2-624(c).
102. 968 F. Supp. at 1580.
103. 528 N.Y.S.2d 482 (Sup. Ct. 1988).
104. 968 F. Supp. at 1580.
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York court's holding was based on a New York statute which provided
that "a restriction of the board's power to manage the business of the
corporation is invalid unless ... all of the incorporators or all of the
shareholders of record have authorized such provision on the certificate
of incorporation ... ,.05 The district court in Invacare found that no
such limitation exists under the Georgia Business Code and that
O.C.G.A. section 14-2-624(c) granted the board of directors sole discretion
to determine
the terms and conditions of shareholder rights agree10 6
ment.
The district court went even further to note that Georgia corporate law
embraced the concept of continuing directors as part of a defense against
hostile takeover.' 7 The concept of the continuing directors approval is
Additionally, the
set forth in the Georgia Fair Price Statute.'
Georgia Business Combination Statute 9 specifically provides that a
bylaw opting into the statute cannot be repealed without "the affirmative
Based on
vote of at least two-thirds of the continuing directors." '
this analysis, the court found Invacare's proposed bylaw invalid as a
matter of law in Georgia."'
F

Legislative Changes

The 1997 Session of the General Assembly of Georgia enacted several
amendments to the Business Code,"' the most notable of which are
summarized below.
1. Share Exchanges. The legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 142-1103(h) to include references to share exchanges." ' This amend-

105. Id. (quoting Bank of New York, 528 N.Y.S.2d at 485).
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. The Georgia Fair Price Statute provides:
that where a vote is needed to approve a business combination, that business
combination must be '(1) unanimously approved by the continuing directors
provided that the continuing directors constitute at least three members of the
board of directors at the time of such approval; or (2) recommended by at least
two-thirds of the continuing directors and approved by a majority of votes entitled
to be cast by holders of voting shares, other than voting shares beneficially owned
by the interested shareholder who is, or whose affiliate is, a party to the business
combination.
Id. (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1111 (1994)).
109. O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1133(b) (1994).
110. 968 F. Supp. at 1580-81 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 14-2-1133(b) (1994)).
111. Id. at 1582.
112. O.C.G.A. §§ 14-2-101 to -1703 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
113. Id. § 14-2-1103(h) cmt. (Supp. 1998).
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ment makes all the rules for action by the shareholders of the acquiring
corporation in a share exchange parallel to those for
action by the
114
shareholders of the surviving corporation in a merger.
2. Dividend on Treasury Shares. The legislature added subsection (d) to O.C.G.A. section 14-2-623 to allow for dividends on treasury
shares." 5 This amendment will allow a corporation to preserve the
relative value of its treasury shares." 6
3. Pledge of Treasury Shares. The legislature added O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-640(e) to allow a corporation to pledge its own treasury
shares as collateral for corporate obligations." 7
4. Voting of Treasury Shares. The legislature amended O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-721(b) to prohibit a corporation from having the ability to
vote its own shares."18
5. Appointment of Inspectors. The legislature added O.C.G.A.
section 14-2-729.1 to the Business Code to require publicly traded
companies to appoint an inspector to be present at all meetings of the
corporation.'19 The inspector is charged with the duties of (1) ascertaining the number of shares outstanding; (2) determining the shares
represented at the meeting; (3) determining the validity of proxies and
ballots; (4) counting all votes; and (5) determining the result. 2 °
II.

PARTNERSHIPS

A. Oral PartnershipAgreement Extinguishes as a Matter of Law
upon Incorporation
In Jamal v. Pirani,2 ' the court of appeals determined that any oral
partnership agreement between three shareholders of a corporation
terminated when the corporation was formed.'22 Jamal, a one-third
shareholder of a corporation formed for the purpose of operating
convenience stores, sued another one-third shareholder, alleging that the

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Id.
Id. § 14-2-623(d) cmt.
Id.
Id. § 14-2-640(e) cmt.
Id. § 14-2-721(b) cmt.
Id. § 14-2-729.1.
Id. § 14-2-729.1(b)(1)-(5).
227 Ga. App. 713, 490 S.E.2d 140 (1997).
Id. at 714, 490 S.E.2d at 141.
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shareholder breached an oral partnership agreement by purchasing two
123
convenience stores for himself rather than for the corporation.
Jamal argued that all three shareholders entered into an oral partnership agreement to purchase and operate convenience stores. The oral
agreement required them to purchase as many additional stores as
possible. Under the agreement,
each of them would have a one-third
124
store.
each
in
interest
The trial court found, and the court of appeals agreed, that the
purported agreement to purchase unspecified stores in the future
terminated as a matter of law when all three individuals incorporated
their business and began operating their venture under the corporate
form.'25
Thus, the court found Jamal's claim against the other
shareholder without merit.'26
B.

PartnershipAgreement Controls a Partner'sRights

In Bumgarner v. Green,'27 the court of appeals found that a partnership agreement allowed partners of a limited partnership to borrow
money against partnership property as well as to reimburse themselves
for property acquisition costs. 12 Green, a limited partner, sued the
other two limited partners and the sole general partner of Wauka, a
limited partnership. Green alleged that the other partners breached a
duty of good faith by encumbering partnership property and reimbursing
29
themselves for expenses of acquisition of partnership property.
Green entered into a partnership agreement with Bumgarner and
Bruce to subdivide and develop real estate owned by Green and his two
brothers. Bumgarner and Bruce borrowed money on personal lines of
credit and purchased the property from Green's brothers. Subsequently,
they transferred their property to the partnership, and Green transferred property he owned to the partnerhsip. The three each received a
33.3% interest in the partnership. All three individuals read and signed
the partnership agreement. After the transfer of the property to the
partnership, the general partner, Senson, Inc., through its president,
Bumgarner, borrowed $342,000 secured by a deed encumbering the
partnership property. The borrowed money reimbursed both Bumgarner

123. Id. at 713, 490 S.E.2d at 140.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 714, 490 S.E.2d at 141 (citing Carnes v. McNeal, 224 Ga. App. 88, 89, 479
S.E.2d 474, 476 (1996); Baker v. Schneider, 210 Ga. 493, 494, 80 S.E.2d 783, 785 (1954)).
126. Id.
127. 227 Ga. App. 156, 489 S.E.2d 43 (1997).
128. Id. at 159, 489 S.E.2d at 46.
129. Id. at 157-59, 489 S.E.2d at 44-46.
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and Bruce for their initial investment in the property, plus interest. The
business of the partnership proved to be very slow and the income
produced did not equal the costs of the interest on the borrowed funds.
The partnership had to sell the property at a loss in order to pay back
the money borrowed against the property. 3 ° Green sued Bumgarner
and Bruce, alleging inter alia, breach of duty of good faith, fraud, mental
distress, and conversion.'3 1
The trial court found the partnership agreement ambiguous on
whether Bumgarner and Bruce had authority to reimburse themselves
for their initial investment.132 A jury returned a verdict in favor of
Green, and Bumgarner and Bruce appealed, arguing that a directed
verdict was required because the partnership agreement specifically
allowed their actions.' 33
The court of appeals found that the partnership agreement expressly
authorized the General Partner to encumber the underlying property
and to reimburse Bumgarner and Bruce for their expenses.'
Under
rules of contract construction, where an agreement is clear and
unambiguous, no construction is required or permitted by the trial
court.'3 In this case, the court of appeals reversed the trial court's
holding, finding that Bumgarner and Bruce never violated their
fiduciary duty to either Green or the partnership.'3 6 The court of
appeals reasoned that the partnership agreement, which controlled the
operations of the partnership, expressly allowed the actions taken by
Bumgarner and37 Bruce and thus precluded any finding of a breach of
1
fiduciary duty.

130. Id. at 157-58, 489 S.E.2d at 44-45.
131. Id. at 158, 489 S.E.2d at 45.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 158-59, 489 S.E.2d at 46.
134. Id. at 159, 489 S.E.2d at 46 (citing Section 14.02 of the Partnership Agreement:
"The Property may be encumbered, sold, or otherwise transferred by the General Partner."
Paragraph VI of the Agreement also states:
the Special Original Limited Partner [Green] shall be entitled to receive or be
allocated from profit and loss in accordance with his respective percentage interest
only after the Original Limited Partners [Bumgarner and Bruce] and the General
Partner [Senson, Inc.] have been reimbursed all additional funds which the
General Partner and the Original Limited Partners shall advance from time to
time to the Limited Partnership for the purposes of paying the acquisition costs
of the real property, title insurance premiums, recording charges, and any and all
other acquisition cost expenses incurred in connection with the acquisition of the
real property ....).

135.
S.E.2d
136.
137.

Id. (citing Lothridge v. First Nat'l Bank of Gainesville, 217 Ga. App. 711, 714, 458
887, 890 (1995)).
Id. at 158-59, 489 S.E.2d at 46.
Id.
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III.

BANKS AND BANKING

Duties of Bank Officers
In Construction Lender, Inc. v. Sutter,38 the court of appeals faced
the task of determining the fiduciary duty owed by a construction lender
to a borrower. The Sutters entered into a loan agreement with The
Construction Lender, Inc. ("TCL") to finance the construction of their
house and to pay off the purchase price for the underlying land. Under
the agreement, TCL would make advances on the construction as long
as TCL was "satisfied" with the progress of the construction.13 9 The
agreement also provided that "all periodic inspections and any appraisals
made by [TCL] [were] for the sole purpose of protecting [TCL's] security
interest in the real estate and determining that progress [had] been
made for the disbursement of construction loan funds as work [had] been
completed."14
After construction began, the Sutters began having problems with the
builder's work. At that point, the Sutters asked Joe Ray, president of
TCL, not to make any further payments to the builder without first
obtaining their approval. For the next three advances, Ray obtained the
approval of the Sutters. However, for the fourth advance, Ray examined
the builder's work himself and paid the builder $47,500 without first
thereafter, the builder abandoned
obtaining the Sutters' approval. Soon
41
the job and declared bankruptcy.
The trial court found Ray and TCL liable to the Sutters on two
separate theories of negligence.142 First, the trial court held that Ray
and TCL breached a duty to ensure that payments made on the loan
were timely and for work actually done.' 43 Second, the trial court
found that Ray and TCL negligently failed to discharge the duty they
voluntarily undertook to obtain the Sutters' approval before disbursing
the final $47,500 to the builder."
The court of appeals agreed with the trial court on one finding and
disagreed on the other. 145 The court of appeals held that the trial
court properly determined that Ray and TCL undertook a duty to obtain
A.

138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

228 Ga. App. 405, 491 S.E.2d 853 (1997).
Id. at 405-06, 491 S.E.2d at 855.
Id. at 406, 491 S.E.2d at 855.
Id.
Id. at 407, 491 S.E.2d at 856.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 410, 491 S.E.2d at 858.
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prior approval when they agreed to do so and then complied with the
request three times.'46 TCL breached that duty when it paid the
builder $47,500 without approval from the Sutters. 4 7 The court of
appeals disagreed with the trial court that Ray and TCL had a duty to
ensure that payments were for work actually performed. 4" The court
of appeals found that generally, "a construction lender has no independent duty to protect the borrower-homeowner from problems associated
with the builder's work, such49 as construction defects or the builder's
failure to pay materialmen."
Additionally, the contract between TCL and the Sutters specified that
all appraisals and inspections were provided solely for TCL's benefit,
disclaimed any liability on the part of TCL for the builder's work, and
described TCL's relationship as that of a mortgage lender. 5 ° Under
this analysis, the court of appeals found that Ray and TCL never
undertook a duty of ensuring that work was performed.'
B. Usurious Rates: National Banks Without Branches in Georgia are
not Subject to Georgia Usury Laws
In Christiansen v. Beneficial National Bank,'52 the United States
District Court for the Southern District of Georgia held that, although
Beneficial National Bank was loaning money to consumers in Georgia,
it did not have a "branch" in Georgia and, thus, was not subject to
Georgia's usury laws.'53 The Christiansens filed their tax return with
H&R Block and received a refund anticipation loan ("RAL") through
Beneficial National Bank.'
After receiving the loan, the Christiansens filed suit claiming that Beneficial, through H&R Block as agent,
violated Georgia's usury laws by charging them 245.249% interest on the
loan. '5 The Christiansens claimed that Georgia law applied because

146. Id. at 407, 491 S.E.2d at 856 (citing Stelts v. Epperson, 201 Ga. App. 405, 407,411
S.E.2d 281, 282 (1991) ("Where one undertakes an act which he has no duty to perform and
another reasonably relies upon that undertaking, the act must generally be performed with
ordinary and reasonable care.")).
147. Id.
148. Id. at 410, 491 S.E.2d at 858.
149. Id. (citing Decoudreaux v. Mutual Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Atlanta, 216 Ga. App.
503, 455 S.E.2d 88 (1995); Harden v. Akridge, 193 Ga. App. 736, 389 S.E.2d 6 (1989); Butts
v. Atlanta Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 152 Ga. App. 40, 262 S.E.2d 230 (1979)).
150. Id.
151. Id.
152. 972 F. Supp. 681 (S.D. Ga. 1997).
153. Id. at 684-85.
154. Id. at 683.
155. Id.
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Beneficial, by obtaining the loans through a local H&R Block office, was
operating a branch office in Georgia.' 56
The court disagreed with the Christiansens' analysis.'57 First, the
court found clear precedent holding that national banks without
interstate branches may charge the interest rate allowable in their home
state to customers located outside of their home state. 5 " In addition,
the court found that the loan agreement had a Delaware choice-of-law
clause that was valid under O.C.G.A. section 7-4-13.159 As a result of
its findings, the district court dismissed the Christiansens' claim against
Beneficial for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be
granted.'6
IV.

A.

SECURITIES

Punitive Damages Awarded in Arbitration

In Greenway Capital Corp. v. Schneider,1 6' the Georgia Court of
Appeals held that, unless expressly barred by the parties' contract,
punitive damage awards are permissible in arbitration of federal
securities laws cases, even where expressly precluded by state law.'62
Schneider instituted an arbitration action before the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. ("NASD") after she lost $49,525 entrusted
to Greenway.' 6 ' Schneider alleged violations of federal securities laws,
violations of the Georgia Securities Act, 64 common law fraud, breach
of fiduciary duty and negligence.16 5
Concluding that Greenway
"exhibited such an entire want of care as to raise the presumption of a
conscious indifference to the rights of the claimant," the arbitrators
awarded Schneider $100,000 in punitive damages pursuant to O.C.G.A.

§ 51-12-5.1.166
Greenway argued in the court of appeals that Georgia law prohibited
punitive damages in negligence cases and, thus, foreclosed any punitive

156. Id.
157. Id. at 684.
158. Id. (citing Cades v. H&R Block, Inc., 43 F.3d 869, 873-74 (4th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 515 U.S. 1103 (1995); Basile v. H&R Block, Inc., 897 F. Supp. 194, 198-99 (E.D. Pa.
1995)).
159. Id. at 684; O.C.G.A. § 7-4-13 (1997).
160. 972 F. Supp. at 685.
161. 229 Ga. App. 485, 494 S.E.2d 287 (1997).
162. Id. at 486, 494 S.E.2d at 289.
163. Id. at 485, 494 S.E.2d at 288.
164. O.C.G.A. §§ 10-5-12, -14 (1994 & Supp. 1998).
165. 229 Ga. App. at 485, 494 S.E.2d at 288.
166. Id. at 485-86, 494 S.E.2d at 288; O.C.G.A. § 51-12-5.1 (Supp. 1998).
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damage award by the arbitrators.16 7 The court of appeals found
Greenway's argument to be without merit.168 The court held that
when there has been no agreement by the parties to be bound by state
arbitration law, and when the transaction involved interstate commerce
within the meaning of the Federal Arbitration Act, state law is
preempted by federal law.'69
The court of appeals also found that Hilton ConstructionCo. v. Martin
1 71
Mechanical Contractors7 ° controlled its decision in this case.
"Whenever a superior court vacates or confirms an award obtained under
the Federal Arbitration Act, that court must 'apply federal substantive
law."172 The court of appeals upheld the arbitrators' decision because,
73
under current federal law, punitive damages are permissible.
B.

Binding Effect of Trial Court Decision
In Mitcham v. Blalock, 74 the Georgia Supreme Court held that a
trial court in Georgia was empowered to protect a judgment it had
entered by enjoining an investor's subsequent arbitration proceeding."' Mitcham filed an arbitration claim against Atlanta Securities
& Investments ("ASI"), his broker, Jones, and the corporate officers of
ASI, asserting that they had bought and sold high risk securities
without his consent.' 76 Mitcham received an award against ASI and
Jones; however, the arbitrators dismissed from the suit the officers of
ASI due to lack of notice. 7 7 Mitcham later filed suit in the Superior
Court of Dekalb County against the officers. 17' The trial court granted
summary judgment for all three officers, and the court of appeals
17
affirmed.
After the grant of summary judgment, Mitcham sought arbitration of
the same claim by filing a statement of claim against the officers with

167. 229 Ga. App. at 486, 494 S.E.2d at 288.
168. Id.
169. Id., 494 S.E.2d at 288-89 (citing North Augusta Assoc. v. 1815 Exchange, 220 Ga.
App. 790, 791, 469 S.E.2d 759, 762 (1996)).
170. 251 Ga. 701, 308 S.E.2d 830 (1983).
171. Greenway, 229 Ga. App. at 486, 494 S.E.2d at 289.
172. Id. (citing Hilton Constr. Co. v. Martin Mechanical Contractors, 251 Ga. 701, 703,
308 S.E.2d 830, 832 (1983)).
173. Id.
174. 268 Ga. 644, 491 S.E.2d 782 (1997).
175. Id. at 648, 491 S.E.2d at 785.
176. Id. at 644, 491 S.E.2d at 783.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 645, 491 S.E.2d at 783.
179. Id.
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the National Association of Securities Dealers. 8 °

The trial court

enjoined Mitcham's arbitration claim on the grounds of res judicata and
collateral estoppel.'18 Mitcham appealed that decision to the Supreme
Court of Georgia. 182 The court found that the Georgia Constitution
authorized a court to exercise "such powers as necessary... to protect
or effectuate its judgments." 8 ' The court also held that O.C.G.A.
section 15-6-8'8' gives a superior court judge the authority to grant
writs of injunction to protect the judgments it has entered. 185

Id.
Id.
Id., 491 S.E.2d at 783-84.
Id., 491 S.E.2d at 784 (citing GA. CONST. art. VI, § I, para. IV (1983)).
O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8 (1994).
268 Ga. at 645, 491 S.E.2d at 784 (citing O.C.G.A. § 15-6-8 (1994)).

